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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a new analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy (Hempel 1945), differing from the one in 
Carnap (1962). Hempel, so it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true 
theories, and another aiming at informative theories. However, so the analysis continues, he also realized that 
these two concepts were conflicting, and so he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative 
theories. It is then shown that one can have the cake and eat it: There is a logic of confirmation that accounts for 
both of these two conflicting aspects. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” (1945) Carl G. Hempel presented the following 
conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation |~  L  L on a language (set of 
sentences closed under negation and conjunction) L: For all E, H in L, 
 
(1) Entailment: E |– H  E |~ H 
(2) Consequence: {H: E |~ H} |– H´  E |~ H´ 
(2.1) Special Consequence: E |~ H, H |– H´  E |~ H´ 
(2.2) Equivalence: E |~ H, H –||– H´  E |~ H´ 
(3) Consistency: {H: E |~ H} |– E 
(3.1) E |– , E |~ H  E |– H 
(3.2) E |– , E |~ H, H |– H´  E |– H´ 
(4) Converse Consequence: E |~ H, H´ |– H  E |~ H´ 
 
Hempel then showed that (1-4) entail that every sentence (observation report) E confirms 
every sentence (theory) H, i.e. for all E, H in L: E |~ H. 
 Since Hempel’s negative result, there has hardly been any progress in constructing a logic of 
confirmation. The only two articles I know of are Zwirn/Zwirn (1996) and Milne (2000). 
Roughly, Zwirn/Zwirn (1996) argue that there is no logic of confirmation taking into account 
all of the partly conflicting aspects of confirmation, whereas Milne (2000) argues that there is 
a logic of confirmation, but that it does not deserve to be called a logic. One reason for this 
seems to be that up to now the predominant view on Hempel’s conditions is the analysis 
Carnap gave in his Logical Foundations of Probability (1962), § 87. 
 
Carnap’s analysis can be summarized as follows: In presenting his first three conditions 
Hempel was mixing up two distinct concepts of confirmation, two distinct explicanda in 
Carnap’s terminology, viz. 
(i) the concept of incremental confirmation (positive statistical relevance, initially 
confirming evidence in Carnap’s terminology) according to which E confirms H iff E 
increases the probability of H, Pr(H | E) > Pr(H), and 
(ii) the concept of absolute confirmation according to which E confirms H iff the 
probability of H given E is greater than some value r, Pr(H | E) > r. 
 
Hempel’s second and third conditions hold true for the second explicandum, but they do not 
hold true for the first explicandum. On the other hand, Hempel’s first condition holds true for 
the first explicandum, but it does so only in a qualified form (Carnap 1962, 473) – namely 
only if H is not already assigned probability 1. 
 
This, however, means that Hempel first had in mind the explicandum of incremental 
confirmation for the entailment condition; then he had in mind the explicandum of absolute 
confirmation for the consequence and the consistency conditions; and then, when Hempel 
presented the converse consequence condition, he got completely confused, so to speak, and 
had in mind still another explicandum or concept of confirmation. Apart from not being very 
charitable, Carnap’s reading of Hempel also leaves open the question what the third 
explicandum might have been. 
 
2. Conflicting Concepts of Confirmation 
 
We present another analysis based on the following two notions. A relation |~  L  L is a 
likeliness relation on the language L iff 
E |~ H, H |– H´  E |~ H´; 
|~ is a loveliness relation on L iff 
E |~ H, H |– H´  E |~ H´. 
These two concepts underlie the two main approaches to confirmation that have been put 
forth in the last century: qualitative Hypothetico-Deductivism HD, and quantitative 
probabilistic Inductive Logic IL. 
 
According to HD, E HD-confirms H if(f) H logically implies E. Hence, if E HD-confirms H 
and H´ logically implies H, then E HD-confirms H´. So HD-confirmation is a loveliness 
relation. 
 
According to IL, the degree of absolute confirmation of H by E equals the probability of H 
given E, Pr(H | E). The natural qualitative counterpart of this quantitative notion is that E 
“absolutely confirms” H iff Pr(H | E) > r, for some value r in [.5, 1] (Carnap’s second 
explicandum). If E absolutely confirms H and H logically implies H´, then E absolutely 
confirms H´. So absolute confirmation is a likeliness relation. 
 
This is not the way Carnap defined qualitative IL-confirmation in his (1962), ch. VII. There 
he required that E raises the probability of H in order for E to qualitatively IL-confirm H, i.e. 
Pr(H | E) > Pr(H). Nevertheless, the above seems to be the natural qualitative counterpart of 
the degree of absolute confirmation. The reason is that later on, the difference between Pr(H | 
E) and Pr(H) was taken as degree of incremental confirmation, and Carnap’s proposal is the 
natural qualitative counterpart of this notion of incremental confirmation. Let us say that E 
incrementally confirms H iff Pr(H | E) > Pr(H). 
 
The loveliness concept underlying HD aims at informative theories, whereas the likeliness 
concept underlying IL aims at true (probable) theories. These two concepts are conflicting in 
the sense that the first increases, whereas the second decreases with the logical strength of the 
theory to be assessed. 
 
3. Hempel Vindicated 
 
Turning back to Hempel’s conditions, note first that Carnap’s second explicandum satisfies 
the entailment condition without qualification: If E logically implies H, then Pr(H | E) = 1  r, 
for any value r in [.5, 1]. 
 
So the following more charitable reading of Hempel seems plausible: When presenting his 
first three conditions, Hempel had in mind Carnap’s second explicandum, the concept of 
absolute confirmation. But then, when discussing the converse consequence condition, 
Hempel also felt the need for a second concept of confirmation: the loveliness concept of 
confirmation aiming at informative theories. 
 
Given that it was the converse consequence condition which Hempel gave up in his Studies, 
the present analysis makes perfect sense of his argumentation: Though he felt the need for the 
second concept of confirmation, Hempel also realized that these two concepts were 
conflicting, and so he abandoned the loveliness concept in favour of the likeliness concept. 
 
4. The Logic of Theory Assessment 
 
However, in a sense one can have the cake and eat it: There is a logic of confirmation that 
takes into account both of these two conflicting concepts. 
 
Roughly speaking, HD says that a good theory is informative, whereas IL says that a good 
theory is true (probable). The driving force behind Hempel’s conditions seems to be the 
insight that a good theory is both true and informative. Hence, in assessing a given theory by 
the available data, one should account for these two conflicting aspects. This is done in the 
following. 
 
Let <W, A, > be a ranking space, where W is a non-empty set of possibilities, A is a field 
over W, i.e. a set of subsets of W containing the empty set  and closed under 
complementation and finite intersections, and : W  N{} is a ranking function (Spohn 
1988, 1990), i.e. a function from W into the set of extended natural numbers N{} such that 
at least one possibility w in W is assigned rank 0.  is extended to a function on A by setting 
() =  and defining, for each non-empty A in A, 
(A) = min{(w): w  A}. 
The conditional rank of B given A, (B | A), is defined as 
 (B | A) = (AB) – (A) if (A) < , 
   = 0        if (A) = . 
A ranking function represents an ordering of disbelief. For A, B in A, (BC | A) measures how 
likely B is given A, whereas (B | AC) measures how much B informs about A, where AC is the 
set-theoretical complement of A with respect to W. 
 
A ranking space <W, A, > is an assessment model for the language L iff W is the set ModL of 
all models for L, Mod()  A for each  in L, and (Mod()) <  for each consistent  in L. 
The consequence relation |~ on the language L induced by an assessment model <ModL, A, 
> is defined as follows: For all H, E in L, 
E |~ H  (Mod(H) | Mod(E))  (Mod(H) | Mod(E)) & 
(Mod(H | Mod(E))  (Mod(H) | Mod(E)) 
where at least one of these inequalities is strict. In words: H is an acceptable theory given E 
(according to ) iff H is at least as likely as and more informative than H given E, or H is 
more likely than and at least as informative as H given E. 
 
On the other (the syntactical) hand, a relation |~  L  L is an assessment relation on L iff |~ 
satisfies the following principles, for all E, H in L: 
(A1) E |~ E        Reflexivity* 
(A2) E |~ H, E –||– E´, H –||– H´  E´ |~ H´    L-Equivalence* 
(A3) E |~ H  E |~ H      Selectivity* 
(A4) E |~ H  E |~ EH      Weak Composition* 
(A5) E |~ H  E |~ H      Loveliness and Likeliness 
(A6) |– EH  EH |~ E or EH |~ H    Either-Or 
(A7) EH |~ E, |– EH  EE |~ E    Negation 1 
(A8) EF |~ E, FH |~ F, |– EH  EH |~ E   quasi Nr 21 
(A9) EF |~ E, FH |~ F, |– EH  EH |~ E   suppl. Nr 21 
(A10) EiEi+1 |~ Ei+1, |– EiEj  nmn: EmEm+1 |~ Em  Minimum 
(A11) E |~ EH, E |~ EH  E |~ H 
(A12) E |~ EH, E |~ EH, |~ E, |~ E  E |~ H 
(A13) EE |~ E, E |– H  EE |~ H 
(A14) EE |~ E, EH |~ E  EE |~ H 
 
The * starred principles are among the core principles in Zwirn/Zwirn (1996). quasi Nr 21 
without the restriction |– EH is the derived rule (21) of the system P in 
Kraus/Lehmann/Magidor (1990). 
 
Theorem: The consequence relation |~ induced by an assessment model <ModL, A, > for L 
is an assessment relation on L. For each assessment relation |~ on L there is an 
assessment model <ModL, A, > for L such that |~ = |~. 
 
The following principles are admissible: 
(A15) E |~ F  H, E |– F  E |~ H      MPC 
(A16) E |~ F, E |– H  E |~ FH or E |~ FH     quasi Composition 
(A17) E |~ EE  E |~ EE       Consistency* 
(A18) E |~ EE  E |~ EE       Informativeness 
(A19) EF |~ H, EF |~ H  E |~ H     Proof by Cases 
 
The following principles are not admissible: 
(N1) E |– H  E |~ H      Entailment (Supraclassicality)* 
(N2) H |– E  E |~ H      Conversion 
(N3) F |~ H, E |– F  E |~ H     Left Monotonicity 
(N4) E |~ F, F |– H  E |~ H    Strong Selectivity 
(N5) EF |~ H, E |~ F  E |~ H    Cut 
(N6) E |~ H, E |~ F  EF |~ H    Cautious Monotonicity 
 
In comparing the present approach with standard nonmonotonic logic in the KLM-tradition 
(Kraus/Lehmann/Magidor 1990), we note two points: 
 
First, the present system is genuinely nonmonotonic in the sense that not only Left, but also 
Right Monotonicity is not admissible: 
 
(N7) E |~ F, F |– H  E |~ H    Right Monotonicity (Right Weakening) 
 
Not only arbitrary strengthening of the premises, but also arbitrary weakening of the 
conclusion is not allowed. The reason is this: By arbitrary weakening of the conclusion 
information is lost – and the less informative conclusion need not be worth taking the risk 
being of led to a false conclusion. 
 
Second, the present approach can explain why everyday reasoning is satisfied with a standard 
that is weaker than truth-preservation in all possible worlds (e.g. truth-preservation in all 
normal worlds): We are willing to take the risk of being led to a false conclusion, because we 
want to arrive at informative conclusions. 
 
Finally, one might wonder how the present logic of theory assessment compares to Carnap’s 
dictum that qualitative confirmation is positive statistical relevance. A first answer is given by 
 
Observation: For every regular probability Pr on a language L, 
|~Pr = +Pr{<E, H>: E –||– H –||– EE}{<E, H>: E –||– H –||– EE} 
is an assessment relation on L, where +Pr is the relation of positive statistical 
relevance in the sense of Pr. 
 
However, theory assessment is not the same as positive statistical relevance, for Symmetry is 
not admissible: 
 
(N8) E |~ H  H |~ E      Symmetry 
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